Explanation of the terms in the image above. This is Godel’s formalized proof of the existence of God.
(Kurt Gödel (1995). “Ontological Proof”. Collected Works: Unpublished Essays & Lectures, Volume III. pp. 403–404. Oxford University Press.
Gödel left in his papers a fourteen-point outline of his philosophical beliefs, that are dated around 1960. They show his deep belief in the rational structure of the world. Here are his 14 points: 1
- The world is rational.
- Human reason can, in principle, be developed more highly (through certain techniques).
- There are systematic methods for the solution of all problems (also art, etc.).
- There are other worlds and rational beings of a different and higher kind.
- The world in which we live is not the only one in which we shall live or have lived.
- There is incomparably more knowable a priori than is currently known.
- The development of human thought since the Renaissance is thoroughly intelligible (durchaus einsichtig).
- Reason in mankind will be developed in every direction.
- Formal rights comprise a real science.
- Materialism is false.
- The higher beings are connected to the others by analogy, not by composition.
- Concepts have an objective existence.
- There is a scientific (exact) philosophy and theology, which deals with concepts of the highest abstractness; and this is also most highly fruitful for science.
- Religions are, for the most part, bad– but religion is not.
Based on this far-reaching rational belief, he thought he can prove the existence of God, in a modified (and logically consistent) version of Anselm’s ontological proof. I admit that his argument needs a lot of explanation. Gödel was a theist, not a pantheist, and he also rejected Einstein’s idea of an impersonal God. He saw himself in the tradition of Leibniz, not Spinoza. It seems that Gödel worked on the “ontological proof” for a long time, and finally, he handed it over to a friend in 1970. It was published in 1987.
- In: Wang, Hao. A Logical Journey: From Gödel to Philosophy. A Bradford Book, 1997. Print. p.316. ↩